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Recent Developments
Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation:
EMPLOYER LIABILITY OUTSIDE
OF THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSAnON ACT
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) did not provide the exclusive remedy for alleged aggravation of a
work-related injury if the aggravation was
a result of intentional medical malpractice.
In Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
64 Md. App. 175, 494 A.2d 748 (1985),
the court ruled that an employee has an option to bring a common law action against
his employer under MD ANN. CODE
art. 10 1, § 44 (1957), when his work-related
injuries are aggravated by the intentional
medical malpractice ofhis employer through
his employer's physicians.
Mr. Sterry, a Bethlehem Steel employee,
injured his back at his place of work in
September, 1970. He was hospitalized because of the injury but returned to work
in December, 1970. On his return he began receiving follow-up medical care from
the company physician. The follow-up
medical care was supplied by Bethlehem
Steel in compliance with MD. ANN.
CODE art. 101, § 37(a)(1957). In August,
1971, Mr. Sterry filed for and began receiving workmen's compensation payments for his injury and he continued under the care of the company physician until
June, 1979 when he voluntarily ceased
treatment. His treatment during these
eight and one half years consisted primarily of prescription medication for pain
alleviation. He was referred to a neurologist and neurosurgeon for evaluation of his
continued pain in 1978. Both consulting
physicians notified the company doctor
that they felt Mr. Sterry was addicted to
his pain medication. -In September, 1979,
a myelogram performed at the direction of
the neurosurgeon was diagnostic of several
ruptured vertebral discs. Mr. Sterry underwent spinal surgery and an unsuccessful detoxification program while under the
care of the neurosurgeon. Mr. Sterry retired in 1980.
Suit was brought by Mr. Sterry in the
Circuit Court of Baltimore County alleging that the Bethlehem Steel physician
caused him to become addicted to narcotics
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during treatment of his work-related injury. The court granted Bethlehem Steel's
motion for summary judgment. On appeal,
the appellant claimed that he was not limited to compensation under the Act for
aggravation of his injuries and his drug
addiction because they were due to intentional acts of fraud and malpractice by
Bethlehem Steel and its physicians to keep
Mr. Sterry working and unaware of the
extent of his medical problems. Under
Section 44 if an injury results from the
"deliberate intention of his employer to
produce such injury," the employee will
have the option of receiving workmen's
compensation or of bringing a common
law action against the employer. Under
this section the court held that if the allegations are "sufficient to state a claim for
the deliberate intention of appellee to produce the injury," the appellant is able to
bring a civil suit against the appellee.
Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 64 Md.
App. at 188.
Prior to the Sterry decision, workmen's
compensation was held to be the exclusive

remedy for aggravation of workplace injuries due to physician or hospital malpractice. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 13.21 (1979). In Nazario v.
Washington Adventist Hospita~ Inc., 45
Md. App. 243, 412 A.2d 1271 (1980), the
court noted that this doctrine was "universally held" and that "the court could see
no reason Maryland should not follow
the universal rule." !d. at 246, 412 A.2d
at 1273.
In the Sterry case, however, the court
did not rely on Nazario but referred extensively to Young v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270
(1985), a decision in which the court found
that the appellant was not limited to compensation under the Act by her employer's
compensation insurer for alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress because it was an intentional act. The appellant had been assaulted at work and claimed
both physical and emotional injury as a
result. Hartford asked that the appellant
be examined by a psychiatrist of their
choice on the issue of emotional injury.

The appellant's private psychiatrist warned
Hartford that she had attempted suicide
previously and that having to submit to a
second exam might cause further psychological stress. Four days after the required
psychiatric exam, the appellant attempted
suicide. She then brought suit alleging
that Hartford "intended to inflict emotional distress in order to cause her to drop
the claim or commit suicide." Young, 303
Md. at 189. There was no claim in this suit
of medical malpractice, and in fact, the examining physician found that her emotional trauma was real and compensable.
The court of appeals ruled that this allegation of intentional infliction of emotional
distress satisfied the criteria of Art. 101
§ 44 and allowed her to bring a common
law action against Hartford.
Sterry is the third in a series of recent
cases which demonstrate the Maryland
courts' willingness to limit the scope of the
exclusivity clause. In Young v. Hartford,
supra, and a similar case decided the same
day, Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 303 Md. 201 492 A.2d
1280 (1985), the court held that a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress
by the employer is not precluded from a
civil tort action. Several months later, in
Sterry, the court allowed the plaintiff to
evade the "universally held" doctrine that
medical malpractice in a workmen's compensation case is exclusively compensable
under the Act. By permitting a semantic
manipulation alleging intentional medical
malpractice, the court appears to provide
another manner of egress from the confines of the exclusivity clause.

owned by Martin-Marietta. Liscombe filed
suit against Potomac Edison and Hagerstown Block for compensatory and punitive
damages for his injuries allegedly sustained
because of the defendants' gross negligence. Motions for summary judgment
were filed by Potomac Edison and Hagerstown Block on the ground that Liscombe
was contributorily negligent as a matter of
law. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and
Liscombe appealed to the court of special
appeals. The court of appeals granted certiorari before any consideration by the
intermediate appellate court.
On appeal Liscombe alleged that the
trial court erred in finding contributory
negligence as a matter of law, and in the
alternative that contributory negligence is
not a defense where the tort is alleged to be
based on wanton or reckless conduct. Liscombe also contended that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit the issue oflast
clear chance to go to the jury.
Liscombe claimed that there were three
areas of disputed facts which compel the
issue of contributory negligence to be determined by the trier offact. First, whether
he had knowledge of a similar accident
which occurred one month prior to his injury. Second, whether his truck actually
touched the wires or whether the electrical
shock was caused by an arcing effect without contact. Third, whether the sunlight
affected his ability to see the wires at the
time of the accident. The court dismissed
these contentions as immaterial, and found
that Liscombe knew of the presence and

inherent danger presented by the wires
and that this was enough to establish his
negligence.
The court relied on its decision in State
v. Potomac Edison Company, 166 Md.
138, 170 A. 568 (1934), in deciding that
the undisputed facts were sufficient to find
Liscombe guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In this case the
court held that "[i]f [the injured person]
knew or should have known that the wire
was dangerous, it follows as of course that
he was negligent in touching it, or in coming near enough to it to receive the shock."
Id., at 147,170 A. at 571. The court went
on to identify three elements, as stated in
Stancill v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 744
F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which must be
established before the plaintiff can be
deemed negligent because he assumed the
risk. The plaintiff must have "(1) had
knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appreciated that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed
himself to it." /d. at 866.
While the court in Stancill spoke in
terms of assumption of risk, in the case at
bar the court held these elements also
prove negligence in cases involving electrical accidents. The court went on to state
that in Maryland, electrical accident cases
have historically fallen under the contributory negligence theory rather than assumption of risk.
After determining that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to the admittedly
dangerous wires and thus his own negligence contributed to his injury, the court
addressed whether the defendants were
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Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.:
CONTRmUTORY NEGLIGENCESTILL A COMPLETE BAR TO
RECOVERY
In Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.,
303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985), the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
dump truck operator who was aware of
overhead powerlines, but nevertheless was
electrically shocked when his truck came
in close proximity to the lines, was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. In so holding, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
In Liscombe the plaintiff, Robert D.
Liscombe, received a severe electric shock
when he raised the bed of his tractor-trailer
dump truck into overhead electric lines belonging to the defendant, Potomac Edison. The injury occurred while Liscombe
was delivering a load of sand to the codefendant, Hagerstown Block, on property
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